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Abstract
The objective of this paper is to identify the determinants of trust in government in
the Latin American countries, using a cross section of average labor market and social
data of the 2007-2012 period. The methodology consists of the estimation of equations
based on the application of Phillips and Hansen’s cointegration least squares, using as
independent variables labor market indicators, as well as those associated with public
expenditures, institutional quality and others. The emphasis of this paper is to study
the association between trust in government and economic and social variables. Results
show that while inequality is an important determinant of trust in government, the rates
of female self employment and quality employment have positive and negative impacts
on trust in government. Male self and quality employment have no impacts. Citizens’
perception that government is committed to combat poverty leads to increased trust in
government. This is a topic that has not received attention in the literature.The main
limitation of this study is the reduced size of the sample of 18 observations. It is concluded
that increasing social expenditures and reducing inequality would be conducive to higher
levels of trust in the government in the Latin American countries.
JEL Classification: H52, G28, D72, D64, D63
Keywords: trust, poverty, education, inequality
La confianza en el gobierno en América Latina
Resumen
El propósito de esta investigación es identificar los determinantes de la confianza en
el gobierno en los países de América Latina, usando datos promedio de dicha variable
del periodo 2007-2012, e indicadores sociales y del mercado laboral. La metodología de
análisis consiste en la estimación de ecuaciones de cointegracion de acuerdo al método
de Phillips y Hansen, expresando un índice de confianza en el gobierno en función de
variables relacionadas con el mercado laboral, gasto público, gobernabilidad, y otras.
Las ecuaciones fueron estimadas por la metodología de “cointegracion least squares” de
Phillips y Hansen. Los resultados indican que la desigualdad reduce la confianza en
el gobierno, mientras que las tasas de auto empleo y de empleo de calidad femeninos
muestran impactos negativo y positivo respectivamente; y las de auto empleo y de empleo
de calidad masculinos no ejercen impactos sobre la confianza. Este es un tópico que no ha
sido analizado en la literatura. La percepción de los ciudadanos de que el gobierno está
atacando el problema de la pobreza incrementa la confianza en el gobierno. La principal
limitación de este trabajo es el reducido número de los datos de corte transversal que
se limita a 18 observaciones. Se concluye que el incremento del gasto social es un medio
para incrementar la confianza en el gobierno.
Clasificación JEL: H52, G28, D72, D64, D63
Palabras clave: confianza, pobreza, educación, desigualdad
1Economista salvadoreño
5456 Paseo General Escalón, apartamento 36, San Salvador, El Salvador, América Central. luisrenecace-
res@gmail.com
330
REMEF (The Mexican Journal of Economics and Finance)
Determinants of Trust in Government in Latin America
1. Introduction
Considerable attention continues being given to the study of trust in government in deve-
loped and developing countries. This interest is the result of the evidence that trust gives
legitimacy to the political system, strengthens democracy, and contributes to increase
economic growth (Zak and Knack, 2001).The study of political trust in Latin America
has special significance given that the Latin American countries have the lowest values of
trust in government of all regions in the world (Latinbarometro, 2017).
This paper presents an analysis of the determinants of trust in government in a sample
of 18 Latin American countries. The paper does not present new theories on this matter,
rather it has a character of “stylized facts”, given its emphasisinstudyingthe associations
between trust in government and economic and social variables. The next section presents
a review of selected literature; this is followed by the data and its characteristics. The
associations between trust with inequality, labor market variables, taxation and political
orientation are analyzed. The paper ends with a series of conclusions.
2. Review of selected literature on trust in the government
Early analysis of trust in government can be attributed to Easton (1965), who distin-
guished between two types of trust in government: diffuse trust, which arises from the
individuals’ convictions of the intrinsic values of democracy, and specific trust, that resides
in citizens’ perception of what they gain from the political process. An underlying concept
in the study of trust in government is that of social capital, which was first proposed as a
distinctive concept by Putman (1995), who classified it as bonding social capital, or the
cohesion between an individual and his close family and groups of friends, and bridging
social capital, which results from the interaction of individuals with groups not akin to
their social stratum.
Clausen, Kraay and Nyiri (2011) used the replies from a sample of 49,019 persons
from 90 countries and inferred that corruption had a negative impact on trust in public
institutions. Other variables with negative repercussions on trust were the individuals’
age, having reached tertiary education, and access to internet and to television.
Chanley (2002) studied trust in the US federal government during the 1980-1997
period reporting that negative perceptions about the economy, scandals in Congress, and
preoccupation with crime, generated the loss of trust in the federal government and in
the Congress.
The World ‘Bank (2015) concluded in the case of the Middle East and North Africa
countries, that the main determinants of trust in national institutions were the citizens’
satisfaction with education and health care services, but the perception of corruption in
the public sector tended to lower their trust2.
Christensen and Laegreid (2002) analyzed trust in public institutions in Norway, repor-
ting that the main determinants were satisfaction with democracy, followed by satisfaction
with public services.
Kouvo (2011) reported that in the European countries trust in government increases
with employment, and decreases with the sense of insecurity. Trust in government was
higher in the Scandinavian countries and in Holland due to their more extensive social
protection programs than those of other countries. In this respect, Easterlin (2013) has
presented evidence that trust in government increases in parallel to the increase in the
benefits from national social protection programs.
2The World Bank (2015) points out that: “Trust in national government is highly associated with the
citizens’ satisfaction with education and health services and with their perception of the pervasiveness
of corruption. . . the probability of trusting the national government increases by 13 percentage points
when respondents are satisfied with education and by 11 percentage points when they are satisfied with
health care. On the other hand, citizens’ trust in public institutions declines by 35 percentage points
when respondents believe that corruption is widespread within their governments (page 10).
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Blind (2006) identified the causes behind the decline of trust in the developed coun-
tries, which included deficient economic performance, corruption, political scandals, and
the perception that the governments did not implement policies to create good jobs. The
variables that increased trust in government were economic growth, job creation, and
improved access to education, security and the combat of corruption.
In the case of Japan, Maeda and Miyahara (2003) used several surveys to identify
the determinants of trust in the national government, in business and in citizens groups.
Their results indicated that trust was determined by transparency and honesty in the
management of public affairs, by the care in attending the needs of the community, and
by the overlap in matters of values.
With respect to Japan and South Korea, Kim (2010) reported that trust in the go-
vernment was determined by its success in conducting the economy, by the quality of
public services, control of corruption, and by the existence of opportunities available to
citizens to participate in public affairs.
In a study on trust in city and national governments in China, Zao and Hu (2015)
reported that the principal determinants were the quality of public services, transparency
of government, and opportunities to participate in government affairs. The authors added
that as the education level of citizens increased, or as their age decreased, their trust in
government tended to decrease.
3. Data and its characteristics
The values of trust in government corresponding to the averages of the 2007-2012 period
were taken from UNDP’s Human Development Report 20133. This publication was also
the source of data on the perception that the government is committed to combat poverty,
and the Gini coefficient. Labor market variables and poverty rates were taken from the
World Bank’s World Development Indicators; the governance indexes were taken from the
World Bank’s World Governance Indicators. The data used in the estimations is presented
on annex 1.
Unit roots tests were conducted to determine whether the variables were stationary.
The ADF tests indicated that all variables, except trust in government and control of
corruption, were not stationary at the 5 per cent level4; the ADF tests were also applied
to the first difference of the variables with results showing that they were stationary and
thus it was inferred that the variables were integrated of order 1. The equations were
estimated using the cointegration least squares methodology (cointegration least squares)
developed by Phillips and Hansen (1990), so as to take into account the non-stationarity
of the variables. The methodology consists of expressing the national index of trust in
government in terms of variables that have been identified in recent literature to be
associated with it. Thus, in general terms, it can be postulated that trust in government
is a function of inequality, labor markets, social systems and education variables.
4. Estimation of equations
Table 1 shows results from the estimation of equations expressing trust in government in
terms of economic and social variables, using cross section data from 18 Latin American
countries5.
In equation 1, the independent variables is the Gini coefficient, which is an indicator
of vertical inequality. The coefficient of the Gini coefficient is negative and significant at
3The measure of trust in government published by UNDP is taken from the Gallup World Poll; it
measures generalized trust, which is based on people’s perception that the government is “doing the right
thing”.
4The ADF tests can be obtained from the author upon request.
5The correlation matrix of the variables used in the estimations are shown on Annex 2; it can be seen
that multicollinearity would not be a problem. In all estimations the number of data points was 18.
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the ten percent level and the equation explains 16 per cent of the variance of trust in
government. This result means that the Gini coefficient by itself explains almost one fifth
of the variance of trust in government; Machado, Scartascini and Tommasi (2011) have
shown that inequality is the main determinant of political conflict in the Latin American
countries6.
It can be seen on equation 2 that the coefficient of the perception that the government
is committed to reduce poverty is positive and significant and the equation explains 45 per
cent of the variance. In equation (3) the coefficient of female self-employment is significant
and negative, but that of male self-employment is negative and not significant (equation
(4). The participation of women in the shadow sector (or self employment), may weaken
their trust in government as women may feel “betrayed” or “frustrated” when they do
not experience an improvement in their labor market status and continue in precarious
labor, while men seem to be “calm” and “patient”, and do not rush to reduce their trust
in government.
Equation (5) shows that the coefficient of female quality employment is positive and
significant but the coefficient of male quality employment is not significant, as seen on
equation (6). This indicates that having a good job stirs in women a sentiment of trust in
the government, as women may feel “thankful”, whereas men feel “indifferent” towards the
government when they have a good job. The case may be that men feel they are “entitled”
to have good jobs, whereas women consider that having a good job is an “accomplishment”.
Another explanation may be that men are more “political” inclined than women and act
according to “party lines”.
The results shown in equation 2-6 denote the aspiration of women that the government
will make reality their desire of having good jobs. This implies that supporting women’s
economic aspirations constitutes a valuable public policy in economic terms, but it is also
a good political tactic that can render important dividends in times of elections.
There is evidence of the existence of a sense of reciprocity (or “gift-exchange” model),
whereby voters that feel that the government’s policies have improved their well-being and
reciprocate voting to benefit the incumbent government7. Moreover, Chanley (2000) has
shown that in the US the deterioration of trust in government may be an early indicator
of adverse electoral outcomes to the party occupying the presidency.
In equation (7) the independent variables are the perception that the government is
committed to reduce poverty and the coverage of health insurance, in percentage terms.
The latter variable shows a positive coefficient which is significant at the five per cent
level. In equation (8) the coefficient of the national coverage of pensions is not significant.
Other equations were estimated with including the independent variables the social
expenditures per capita, education expenditures as percentage of the GDP, and World
Bank governance indicators, such as those of Rule of Law and Control of Corruption,
but their coefficients turned out to be insignificant. These results contrasts with those
of Justino and Martorano (2018) who have shown that in the Latin American countries
public sector social expenditures lessen political tensions, and that since 1980 the actual
increases of these expenditures has been accompanied by negative trends in political
conflicts.
6The negative impact of inequality on trust in other people has been analyzed by Barone and Mocetti
(20160, Hagfords and Kajanona (2007, and Rothstein and Ulsaner (2005). Caceres (2017) has presented
a review of the determinants of trust in people.
7A review of the literature of the gift-exchange model is presented by Manacorda, Miguel and Vigorito
(2011). These authors concluded on their evaluation of a conditioned cash transfer program in Uruguay
that: “we cannot rule out a gift-exchange model between voters and politicians, where voters feel a sense
of indebtedness to the politicians and political parties who favored them in the past, albeit an effect that
might decay as time elapses since the transfer. . . The results indicate that government economic policies
can have large and persistent impacts on beneficiaries’ political and social attitudes (page 24).
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Table 1. Determinants of trust in government8.
Equation Number:
Independent Variables: (1) (2) (3) (4)
Constant 81.1337*** 10.5489 4.7091 1.7384
(23.18) (9.03) (6.23) (7.26)
Gini -80.7105* .
(46.60)
Commitment to reduce poverty 0.7496** 1.0062*** 1.00025***
(0.21) (0.07) (0.13)
Selfemployfem -0.1800**
(0.08)
Selfemplotmasc -0.0963
(0.14)
R2 0.16 0.45 0.81 0.76
F. statistic 3.00 13.30 30.51 22.69
Prob 0.102487 0.002171 0.000008 0.000040
Significance levels: *** 1%; **5%;*10%
Table 1 continuation. Determinants of trust in government9.
Equation Number
Independent variables (5) (6) (7) (8)
Constant -14.2314 -6.9656 3.1891 -1.7842
(8.30) (11.77) (9.61) (11.68)
Commitment to reduce poverty 1.0126*** 0.9989*** 0.6980*** 0.7981***
(0.13) (0.15) (0.13) (0.20)
Quality female Employment 0.2010**
(0.09)
Quality male Employment 0.0840 .
(0.13)
Health coverage 0.2253**
(0.08)
Pension coverage 0.1723
(0.12)
R2 0.82 0.76 0.63 0.55
F 31.50 22.52 11.13 8.44
Prob. 0.000006 0.000042 0.001500 0.004000
Significance levels:***1%; ** 5%; *10%
5. National culture and trust in government
A question that may arise is whether an indicator of national culture should be included as
an independent variable in the equations shown on table 1. The estimated equations have
R squared of around 70 per cent in all cases, indicating that they explain high percentages
of the variance of trust in government; however, it can be argued that national culture
would exert an impact on trust in government.
Fatih, Kalemly-Ozcan and Sorensen (2007) resorted to indicators of social capital to
represent the prevailing culture in a region or country, using as expressions of culture,
measures of trust and confidence. The indicator of trust was based on the replies to the
question” “Most people can be trusted”, and “I trust most people in the country”, whereas
the indicators of confidence was based on the replies to the questions: “I trust the courts”,
8The standard deviations of the coefficients are shown underneath the respective coefficients.
9The standard deviations of the coefficients are shown underneath the respective coefficients.
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and “I trust the parliament”. Both indicators were computed from the replies in the World
Values Survey. These authors presented results showing that those indicators of culture
explained the capital inflows to regions of a European country, but not between countries.
Tabellini (2005) used similar indicators of culture to determine the role of culture on per
capita income levels of European regions. However, Tabellini’s and Fatih, Kalemly-Ozcan
and Sorensen’s indicators differ from the indicator used in this paper. The indicator used
in this paper is trust in government, which refers to the Executive branch.
Levitt (2015) has argued that trust in people, and interactions with fellow citizens,
which can be viewed as a measure of national culture, determine people’s political at-
titudes. Levitt tested whether ethnic discrimination, an indicator of national culture,
motivates mistrust in government in the Latin American countries, reporting that such
effect is modest and is directed primarily to Congress and high courts, without significant
impact on trust in the government10. Levitt (2015) reported that in the Latin American
countries, people’s perception of discrimination or mistreatment in public offices leads
to decreased trust in government when the incumbent President belongs to a party of
“left” orientation, which is expected to represent “the people”. The experiences of eth-
nic minorities in the US is different: African Americans who have long been victims of
discrimination report low levels of trust in government (Avery, 2006).
Several authors have reported that other indicators of national culture such as parti-
cipation in religious activities, attendance to public events and participation in sports are
determinants of trust in other people. However, in the Latin American countries there is
no association between trust in other people and trust in government, as shown on graph
1.
Graph 1. Trust in other people and in government.
10Kuovo (2010) presented an analysis of the negative impacts of racial discrimination of trust in other
people in European countries and the US.
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6. Social services, inequality and trust
The manner in which inequality affects trust in government is analyzed on graph 2. Qua-
drant1 shows the negative association between inequality, INEQ1, and social expenditures,
Sexp, (Caceres, 2017).Quadrant 2 depicts a negative relationship between inequality and
bridging social capital, Socialcapit, (Brehm and Rehm (1997). There is evidence that
bridging social capital is determined by the level of education, by being employed and by
participation in church activities, and that it engenders attitudes that promote civil liber-
ties and racial and gender equality (Growiec and Growiec, 2014). Quadrant 3 shows the
positive association between social capital and trust in government, a relationship detec-
ted by several authors (Brehm and Rehm, 1997). Quadrants 1 and 3 provide the basis to
derive the relationship shown on quadrant 4 expressing the positive association between
social expenditures and trust in government, which has been shown by several authors
(World Bank, 2015). These graphs indicate when social expenditures decrease from s1 to
s2, social capital and trust decrease from k1 to k2, and from T1 to T2 respectively.
Quadrant 5 presents the positive relationship between bridging social capital and
economic growth, Growth, as has been reported by Beugelsdijk and Smulders (2003);
the fall in social capital is conducive to a reduction in economic growth, from g1 to
g2, which in turns gives rise to an additional increase in inequality from e1 to e2, as
shown on quadrant 6. Using quadrants 1 and 6 a relationship is obtained on quadrant 7
which shows that the initial increase in inequality, Ineq1, has given rise to a subsequent
additional increase in inequality, INEQ2. This means that an initial cut in social spending
has led to a cumulative process whereby inequality reproduces itself.
Quadrant 8 shows the 45 degrees line that permits the construction of a negative
relationship between inequality and trust (quadrant 9). Quadrants 6 and 8 are used to
construct a positive relationship between trust in government and economic growth (qua-
drant 10), a relationship that has been reported by several authors (Citrin and Greene,
1986; Knack and Keefer, 1997).
Quadrant 11 shows the negative association between trust and crime, which has been
reported by Chanley (2000). Using this relationship and the one shown on quadrant 6, it
is possible to derive a positive association between crime and inequality (quadrant 12), as
has been shown by Caceres (2017). As well, quadrant 13 shows the negative association
between social capital and crime.
Graph 2has shown that a reduction of social expenditures can give rise to persistent
increases in inequality, thus undermining social capital, trust in government, economic
growth, and promoting crime. In fact, Voth (2011) has shown that expansive fiscal poli-
cies lead to reductions in political tensions in the Latin American countries; this author
concluded that “social peace can be bought”.
Next, the assumption is made that in a given country there emerges a sentiment
of resentment in some groups of society because they perceive they do not receive a fair
share of national public goods and are left behind in the availability of good jobs. Or some
members of society may perceive that ethnic minorities receive an “undeserving” attention
from the government. This situation gives rise to lower tolerance of racial or economic
differences, which would lower bridging social capital, which has distinct repercussions on
inequality. This is represent in quadrant 2 by a downward shift of the line representing
the association between bridging social capital and inequality, indicating that the original
level of inequality now gives rise to lower levels of social capital by virtue of the increased
social frictions. In this case a new relationship between social expenditure and trust in
government is obtained on quadrant 4, which shows that to the previous levels of social
expenditures there correspondents lower levels of trust. This process can be aggravated
by cuts in social expenditures which would engender increased political instability or the
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perception that public policies are irrelevant to the preferences of the population11, which
may lead to the rupture of the political process.
Graph 2. Social expenditures, inequality and trust.
7. Trust and government political orientation in Latin America
Table 2 shows the 10 Latin American countries with the highest percentages of the popu-
lation who believe the government is attacking the problem of poverty in the 2007-2012
period, taken from UNDP’s Human Development Report 2013. It can be seen that the
highest percentages correspond to 5 countries whose governments can be classified as “lef-
tist”. This table also shows 10 countries with the highest ratings of trust in government;
with the exception of Guatemala, Mexico and Dominican Republic, the governments of
the other 7 countries can be classified as “leftist”. This suggests that in that period the
“leftist” governments of Latin America received more trust from the respective popula-
tions, because the population perceived that they were committed to poverty reduction.
This result cannot be interpreted as a result of “populism”, rather it exemplifies a popu-
lation that is avid of good jobs, and that it is knowledgeable of the governments that are
working towards that end.
11On this matter Miller (1974) has pointed out: “A period of sustained discontent may result from
a deep-seated social conflict which, for some segment of the population, has been translated into a
negative orientation toward the political system because their sense of insufficient political influence
implies a futility in bringing about desired social change or control through political efforts; hence they
feel government is generally not to be trusted because it does not function for them.” (page 951).
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Table 2. Trust in the government and perception that the government is committed to
combat poverty
Trust in government (2007-2012).
Percentage points
Perception government attends
poverty reduction (2007-2012).
Percentage points
Ecuador 64 Venezuela RB 60
Uruguay 58 Ecuador 59
Nicaragua 57 Uruguay 58
Venezuela RB 54 Bolivia 56
Guatemala 50 Nicaragua 53
Brazil 46 Republic Dominic 46
Bolivia 44 El Salvador 43
Dominican Republic 43 Brazil 43
Argentina 42 Guatemala 41
Mexico 36
There exists evidence that “leftist” Latin American governments, contrary to those
of other orientations, implement policies that benefit the population and strengthen the
state (Grassi and Memoli, 2016). This evidence also exists in other regions where “lef-
tist” governments have been more successful than governments of other orientation in
improving social conditions. Muntaner et al. (2002) reported that in the US, Canada
and 14 European countries, governments of “left” parties (mainly the social democracy
governments) had more positive impacts on the social indicators than governments of
other nature12. It has to be pointed out, that in the Latin American countries, “left” par-
ties encounter difficulties to increase tax revenues (Huber, Nielsen, Pribble and Stephens,
2006)13, and in consequence may have difficulties delivering the public goods demanded
by the population.
8. Taxes and trust in government
Graph 3 shows that as the 2012 values of tax revenues as percentage of GDP, (Tax),
increase, trust in government, (Trusttax), tends to increase in the Latin American coun-
tries14, and corroborates the argument that what matters to the population is the ability
of the government to deliver public social goods, and this ability is determined by the
availability of tax resources. It can thus be argued that maintaining low tax revenues
represents the promotion of political instability.
12This result is also reported by Hagfors and Kajanoja (2007) based on the analysis of data from 23
European countries.
13These authors indicate that: “for new emerging left-wing parties, generating new resources through
tax reform has been politically difficult, as has restructuring of the old inegalitarian social security
systems. Privileged groups have the political advantage not only under authoritarianism, but also under
democracy” (page 961).
14The estimated equation is: trust in government = 26.9764 + 0.7383Tax2012 (4.03) (2.22)
R squared = 0.15 (The “t” statistics are shown underneath the corresponding coefficients).
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Graph 3. Tax revenues as percentage of GDP in 2012, (TAX), and trust in government
(TrustTax).
The repercussions of tax revenues on trust in government and other variables is shown
on graph 4.Quadrant (1) shows the increase in education expenditures, Eduexpen, re-
sulting from increasing tax revenues, Tax1. Evidence from Latin America indicates that
increased expenditure in education leads to increasing levels of school attainment (Cace-
res, 2018), which is the relationship shown on quadrant (2). In Latin America, poverty
decreases as education attainment, Education, increases (Psacharopoulos et al, 1995; Ca-
ceres, 2018), as shown on quadrant (3). With quadrants (1) and (3), quadrant (4) is cons-
tructed, which depicts a negative association between tax revenues and poverty, Poverty.
Quadrant (5) shows the inverse relationship between poverty and trust in government,
Trust, a relationship that was shown by equation (8) on table 1. Using the 45 degrees line
of quadrant (6) a relationship is obtained on quadrant (7) depicting the increase in trust
in government resulting from increasing tax revenues, as was shown on graph3.
Quadrant (8) shows the negative association between education attainment and inequa-
lity (Lopez-Calva and Lustig, 2009).With quadrants (7) and (8) a negative association
between tax revenues and inequality is obtained on quadrant (9), while quadrant (10)
shows the negative association between inequality and trust, as shown by equation 1 on
table 1.
Quadrant (11) depicts a positive association between education attainment and econo-
mic growth, which has been reported by a vast literature, while quadrant (12) represents
the positive association between the initial increase in tax revenues and economic growth.
The implication is that increasing tax revenues to provide additional financing to educa-
tion imparts dynamism to economic growth.
The resulting economic dynamism gives rise to a new increase in tax revenues, which
is called Tax2 on quadrant (13). Using the 45 degrees line of quadrant (14) a relationship
is obtained on quadrant (15) that depicts the positive association between the initial and
subsequent increases in tax revenues, Tax1 and Tax2 respectively. The new increase in tax
revenues leads to an additional improvement in trust in government, shown on quadrant
(16), which indicates that trust in government and tax revenues increase persistently as
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part of this virtuous cycle.
This process is backed by solid evidence from economic literature.
Graph 4. Taxation and trust in government.
9. Taxation and trust in historical perspective
The relationships described on the quadrants of graph 4are of a dynamic nature in the
sense that past values of a given variable exert impacts on the current values of other
variables. Graph 5depicts the negative association between per capita taxes paid in 10
Latin American countries in 1870, (TAX1870), taken from Sokoloff and Zolt (2004), and
the corresponding ratio of the share of national income received by the fifth quintile, the
richest, to the first quintile, the poorest, (Q5Q1), in 2008. This is the association shown
on quadrant 9 on graph 4; it suggests that deficient taxation has been reproduced through
time, thus imparting persistence to inequality15.
15The authors point out that: “the greater inequality that prevailed in Latin America and in the
British colonies in the West Indies likely exacerbated the collective action problems associated with
the establishment and funding of universal public schools, because the distribution of the benefits to
establishing a broader system of public schools would have been quite different from the incidence of
taxes that would have been necessary to finance them. Where the wealthy enjoyed disproportionate
political power, they were able to procure schooling services for their own children and to resist being
taxed to underwrite or subsidize services to others” (page 95).
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Graph 5. Per capita taxation in 1870 and income distribution in 2008.
A point to stress is the inverse relationship between 2008 inequality (Q5/Q1) and 2010
per capita social expenditures, (Gastosocialpc), as shown on graph 6.
Graph 6. Income distribution (Q5/Q1) and 2010 per capita public social expenditures.
Given that the current Q5Q1 indicator mirrors taxation prevailing in 1870, (graph
5), it is no surprise that current per capita education expenditures, (Gastoedupc), reflect
1870 taxation, as shown on graph 7.
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Graph 7. Per capita education expenditures in 2010 and per capita taxes in 1870.
10. Economic growth and trust in government
There exists evidence that people’s evaluation of the domestic economy have incidence
on their trust in government (Chanley, 2002; Citrin and Green, 1986).
Graph 8 shows the trajectory of the Latin American countries’ regional measures of
trust in government, taken from LatinBarometro (2017), and regional average annual
rates of economic growth, during the 2002-2015 period. It can be seen that both series
tend to move in synchronism, with a persistent declining tendency since 2009 when the
global crisis was felt with more intensity in the Latin American countries. An equation
was estimated expressing regional trust in government in terms of the regional annual
rate of regional economic growth with two year lag, with the following results:
Trustor = 36.2858 + 1.0236Econgrowth(-2) R2 = 0.35
(19.40) (2.30)
(The “t” statistics are shown underneath the corresponding coefficients).
Graph 8. Trust in government and economic growth, regional averages.
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The coefficient of economic growth is significant and positive, such that a one point
increase in lagged economic growth leads to an increase in trust in government of 1
percentage point. The initial deterioration of economic activity starts to undermine trust
after two years, so governments have time to correct economic course.
Reference should be made to Welsh and Kuhling (2016) study that showed that, in
thirty OECD countries, the indexes of economic activity, inflation, and unemployment
rates, exerted appreciable impacts on subjective wellbeing. A linear combination of these
three macroeconomic variables was associated with the indexes of national institutions
such as civil liberties and control of corruption.
Arthur Okun proposed the computation of a “misery index” composed of the sum of
the annual inflation rate and the unemployment rate, which is still used in some media
outlets to provide an approximation to people’s perception of the economy. Lovell and
Tien (2000) reported that this index is a good predictor of consumer sentiment. It would
be interesting to construct a government misery index that can gauge the strength of
trust in government in the Latin America countries, without resorting to the Gallup Poll
or the World Value Survey, and others. As an example, the sum of the Gini coefficient
and the poverty gap can provide a simple, easy to compute index of trust in government,
as shown on graph 9. It can be seen that if the two outliers, Honduras and Nicaragua,
are discarded, the negative association between trust and the proposed index is close, so
the index can be used to assess and predict citizens’ satisfaction with the government.
Graph 9. Government Misery Index and trust in government.
Hetherington’s (1999) indicated that a drop of trust in government motivates citizens
to support and vote against the incumbent president’s party. Thus, the case may be
that the Latin American “pink tide” has receded because of the adverse repercussions on
economic growth from the global crisis and the fall in commodity prices.
11. Crime and trust in the government
The Pew Research Center (1998) has reported that rising crime undermines trust in
government in the US. It can be seen on graph 10 that there exists a negative association
between the 2012 homicide rates, (number of homicides per 100,000 people), taken from
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UNDP (2013), and trust in government in the Latin American countries16.
Graph 10. Crime rate and trust in government.
Graph 10 can be associated with the evidence that crime declines with the increase of
quality employment and with improvements in social services, (Caceres 2017), variables
that have positive associations with trust in government. As well, there is evidence that
in countries where poverty declined in the 2002-2010 period, their 2012 homicides rates
tended to be low, (graph 11),and consequently trust would tend to be high.
Graph 11. Actual poverty reduction between 2002 and 2012 and actual homicide rate
in 2012.
16On crime and personal trust in Latin American countries, see Caceres (2017) and Corbacho et al
(2012).
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Graph 12 shows that remittances as percentage of GDP have a negative association
with the reduction of poverty, implying that people do not emigrate from countries where
poverty has been reduced. This is evidence that emigration, and remittances, result from
deficient social services and poverty in the source country (Caceres, 2017).
Graph 12. Poverty reduction and remittances.
It can be deduced that the inability of governments to deliver social public goods
leads to increased crime. It can be argued that this inability rests on the scarcity of tax
revenues; in fact, there is a negative association between taxes as a percentage of GDP,
(TAXGDP), and the homicides rates, as shown on graph13.
Graph 13. 2012 taxes as percentage of GDP and 2007-2012 homicide rate.
Graph 6 showed that in a sample of Latin America countries their per capita tax
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revenues in 1870 were associated with their 2010 per capita education expenditures; this
explains the negative association between the 1870 per capita tax revenues and the co-
rresponding 2012 homicide rate shown on graph 14.
The implication is that the reluctance or opposition to increase taxes exerted by spe-
cific groups has been reproduced since 1870, thus constraining the capacity of the public
sector to increase social services, and consequently generating the rise of underemploy-
ment, emigration, and violence.
Graph 14. Per capita tax in 1870 and homicide rate in 2012.
Given the existence of a negative association between the homicide rate and trust in
government, (graph 10), it can be expected that countries where the crime rates have
fallen would have larger values of trust in government than countries where crime has not
decreased. The implication is the reductions of crime and poverty can become determi-
nants of the outcomes of the electoral processes17.
12. Trust as a latent variable
The indexes of trust in government are generally obtained by means of surveys of specific
or random populations. A potential more precise manner of measuring trust in govern-
ment consists of assuming that trust is a latent variable, and furthermore, identifying the
corresponding cause and indicator variables. This model is shown on graph 15.
The cause variables can be indicators of self and quality employment, measures of
inequality, poverty, tax ratio, and corruption. The indicator variables can represent in-
dicators of labor productivity, economic growth, and investment, economic and social
stability.
17The Washington Post of November 8, 2017, reported that New York City’s mayor Bill de Blasio won
reelection in the November 7 elections, “capitalizing on economic growth, (and) low crime”, page A4.
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Cause variables Latent variable Indicator variables
Graph 15. Trust in government as a latent variable
13. Robustness
Robustness tests were carried out including additional independent variables to the base
line equations presented on table 1, with results shown on table 3. Equation (1) indicates
that the coefficient of the new control variable, Rule of Law, is not significant and the
sizes of the coefficients of the other control variables are similar to those of equation (2) on
table 1. A similar result is obtained on equation (2) with the additional variable Control
of corruption, whose coefficient is not significant and those of the base original variables
are similar to those of equation (3) on table 1. In equation (3) the additional control
variable is the National Index of Happiness, taken from UNDP (2013), whose coefficient
is not significant and the coefficients of the other control variables did not change with
respect to those of equation (4) on table 1. In equation (4) the coefficient of control of
corruption is not significant and the coefficients of the other variables are similar to those
of the baseline. These results can be interpreted in the sense that the results presented
on the base line case, table 1, are robust to the inclusion of additional variables.
Table 3. Trust in government. Robustness tests18
Equation Number
Indepent Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
Constant 5.3311 0.6284 -4.0378 -4.0372
(0.79) (0.37) (12.17) (14.70)
Commitment to
reduce poverty 0.9963** 0.9978*** 1.0284*** 0.9937***
(0.13) (0.16) (0.13) (0.16)
Selfemplofeme -0.1719
(0.09)
Rulelaw -0.7023
(2.20)
Selfemplomasc -0.0589
(0.18)
Controlcorruption 0.8302 0.9764
(2.76) (2.75)
Cualityemplofeme 0.3101***
(0.13)
Happiness -2.7335
(2.45)
Qualityemplomasc 0.0422
(0.18)
R2 0.81 0.76 0.76 0.77
F.statistic 19.0716 14.1758 21.9250 14.17
Prob (0.000000) (0.000222) (0.0000211) (0.000123)
Significance levels:*** 1%; **5%; *10%
18The standard deviations of the coefficients are shown underneath the respective coefficients.
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14. Conclusions
Results presented on equations (2)-(5) of table 1 denote the existence of a relationship
of reciprocity between citizens who feel their wellbeing has improved as a consequence of
government policies and the current government. This implies that citizens will support
the incumbent party and express their gratitude in elections. Given that this relationship
is of a “transactions” nature, there may be only a reduced space where ideology matters.
This means that increasing social spending, which is usually viewed as “populism” can
have an important role in promoting social and political stability, and in the consolidation
of democracy19. In the setting of the “gift exchange” model ideology has no role, what
matters is the government capacity to deliver social goods. But this requires additional tax
revenues, and in their absence social instability may arise. The opposition to taxation may
be disguised as economic ideology as it is claimed that taxes decrease private investment
and castigate work; however, there is no basis behind such claims, and thus that “ideology”
may be only an expression of greed and power. A perverse case may occur when certain
groups manifest their desire that the supply of social goods destined to ethnic minorities
be reduced or eliminated and the government acts accordingly, as in a model where the
basis of the “gift exchange” model is racism.
The evidence presented in this work shows that trust in government increases with the
reduction of poverty and decreases with increases in inequality. The question that arises
is why all governments do not carry out more significant programs to reduce poverty and
inequality.
Weak public finances have not permitted some of the Latin American countries to
generate a virtuous circle of taxation, increased human capital spending, increased econo-
mic growth, additional tax revenues, and so on, which has left the distribution of income,
and the corresponding “capture” of government, unchanged, and thus the blockade to
larger tax revenues and social services has continued unabated. Inadequate taxation may
be viewed as a consequence of governments that have been “captured” and where higher
income groups exert the “privilege” to abuse and use their “brand” to manipulate national
institutions to their personal benefits (CEPAL, 2018).
Given that the population in many countries have scant knowledge of the important
issues that have incidence on the country, it is possible that wide segments of the popula-
tion be influenced by campaigns that demonize tax increases and social spending, which
are labeled as “populism”, and in consequence vote against their interests. This would
give rise to a situation whereby the government would continue “captured” by the higher
incomes groups, (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2008), or democracy itself becomes “captured”,
and be used as a “show”, as depicted by Acemoglu , Johnson, Robinson and Yared (2008).
The underlying cause of these phenomena is inequality in the distribution of income,
which enables high income groups to employ their economic power to become “owners” of
the political process, with ability to conduct campaigns dressed as rallying cries to sup-
port “democracy” and “freedom”, which may induce groups of the population to betray
their interests. As a consequence, the precarious social situation may persist unchanged,
or may experience deteriorations. Acemoglu and Robinson (2008) have pointed out that
the expansion and consolidation of democracy in Latin America in the last decades has
not been accompanied of an improved capacity of the state to mobilize domestic fiscal re-
sources and to establish social policies, given that despite the surge of de jure institutions,
factual power in the hands of economic groups still can determine the trajectory of the
state. As well, there exists a possible scenario in which a segment of the population opts
to vote in an election against the incumbent government, so as to “punish them” or “teach
them a lesson”, as in a flair of “machismo”, ignoring the real possibility that, actually, it is
19Evidence of the role of social expenditures in the promotion of political and social stability is presented
by Taydas and Peksen (2012).
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contributing to the victory of a government that would not attend the needs of the poor
and would curtail social investments. This would be the case of unknowingly self-inflicted
wounds incurred by the population.
It was shown on graphs3 and 4 that increasing taxation and consequently supporting
additional expenditures in social services, increases trust in government, economic growth
and political stability. It is encouraging that populism, a model that seeks to increase the
supply of social public goods, and which traditionally has been viewed with derogatory
terms in the media and in fake news, is being nowadays recognized as a good economic
policy (Rodrik, 2018).
There may exist a vicious circle in some Latin American countries whereby inequality
gives rise to persistent political and social instability. Education is the variable that
contributes to lessen inequality (Martner and Gonzalez, 2011) and thus would increase
trust in government, but the financing of the expansion of education is inhibited by the
opposition to increase tax revenues exerted by the high income groups. Thus the economy
remains in a perverse equilibrium of low tax revenues, low social expenditures, political
instability, violence and persistent inequality.
It was shown that low levels of social expenditures undermine trust in government;
in this context, if the population expresses discontent and social frictions ensues, this
phenomenon should not be interpreted as a “conspiracy” against “democratic values”;
it represents the response to a political system that does not deliver. In the absence
of solutions to their demands, groups of citizens may organize violent actions that may
eventual undermine democracy. It has to be stressed that there is evidence that the supply
of social services is an important determinant of social peace (Justino and Martorano,
2018; Taydas and Peksen, 2012).
A special case may occur when racism is prevalent in a country. Racism is an obstacle
to trust as it hinders communication among citizens, thus leading to a fragmented society,
one without a common shared view of the future. There is evidence that that in the US
racism is the cause of the opposition to increase taxes, so as to limit the access to the social
safety net by ethnic minorities (Roemer and Lee, 2004). Thus racism and prejudice can
be seen as blocks to the development of an inclusive society where every citizen is valued
on the same terms, without regard to gender, religious creed, age, without discrimination
to persons with disabilities or with sexual orientation different from that of the majority,
and without discrimination in terms of place of residence or color of skin. An implication
is that trust in government, and governance in general, should be analyzed taking into
consideration all ramifications that emanate from racism, particularly in the context of
the exchange of political support to the incumbent government in gratitude of racist
policies.
If Latin American countries are going to consolidate democracy they must give the
highest priority to the execution of a social policy that promotes the expansion of public
goods to all member of society in equal quantity and quality, to comply with the mandate
that human rights of all citizens must be attended to without discrimination, and to exalt
life and reject death, so that all citizens can say:
Free at last! Free at last!
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Annex 1. Data used in estimations.
Country TRUSTGOVERNMENT Selfemplo Selfemplo Qualityemp Qualityemp CommitmentFemenine Masculine Femenine Masculine Gini Proverty
CHILE 34 26 27 62.2 62.2 0.516 35
ARGENTINA 42 18.80 26 81.2 81.2 0.475 34
URUGUAY 58 24.3 29.2 75.6 75.6 0.038 58
PANAMA 36 28.7 34 71.3 71.3 0.531 37
MEXICO 36 34.8 33.1 65.2 65.2 0.092 41
COSTARICA 28 20.2 26.1 79.8 79.8 0.504 28
RB VEN 54 37.8 44.1 62.2 62.2 0.405 60
PERU 27 56.4 48.1 43.6 43.6 0.449 37
BRAZIL 46 25.1 32.6 69.2 69.2 0.567 43
ECUADOR 64 43.9 62 56.1 56.1 0.444 59
COLOMBIA 36 53.6 53.4 46.2 46.2 0.536 34
R. DOMINICANA 43 23.9 52.3 45.4 45.4 0.517 46
EL SALVADOR 31 48.3 37.1 51.6 51.6 0.437 43
BOLIVIA 44 67.1 53.7 32.9 32.9 0.472 56
PARAGUAY 30 52.5 46.7 48.5 48.5 0.546 33
HONDURAS 26 58.7 54 41.3 41.3 0.567 32
NICARAGUA 57 58.5 50.8 41.5 41.5 0.478 53
GUATEMALA 50 0.585 41
Annex 2. Correlation matrix.
Trust in
goverment Selfemplofeme Selfemplomasc Qualityemplofeme Qualituemplomasc Povertygap
Control
corrution Rukeoflaw Gini Happyness
Trust in goverment 1.00
Selfemplofeme 0.11 1.00
Selfemplomasc -0.21 0.74 1.00
Qualityemplofeme 0.10 -0.87 -0.83 1.00
Qualituemplomasc -0.21 -0.66 -0.99 0.82 1.00
Povertygap 0.45 0.67 0.54 0.68 0.52 1.00
Control corrution -0.05 -0.51 -0.66 0.51 0.66 -0.47 1.00
Rukeoflaw -0.17 -0.42 -0.61 0.37 0.59 -0.39 0.10 1.00
Gini -0.53 0.02 0.05 0.14 0.09 0.18 -0.10 0.10 1.00
Happyness 0.05 -0.51 -0.66 0.72 0.69 -0.65 0.34 0.34 -0.16 1.00
